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JEDEDIAH BRITTON-PURDY, DAVID SINGH GREWAL,
AMY KAPCZYNSKI & K. SABEEL RAHMAN

Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework:
Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis
abstract. We live in a time of interrelated crises. Economic inequality and precarity, and
crises of democracy, climate change, and more raise signiﬁcant challenges for legal scholarship and
thought. “Neoliberal” premises undergird many ﬁelds of law and have helped authorize policies
and practices that reaffirm the inequities of the current era. In particular, market efficiency, neutrality, and formal equality have rendered key kinds of power invisible, and generated a skepticism
of democratic politics. The result of these presumptions is what we call the “Twentieth-Century
Synthesis”: a pervasive view of law that encases “the market” from claims of justice and conceals
it from analyses of power.
This Feature offers a framework for identifying and critiquing the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. This is also a framework for a new “law-and-political-economy approach” to legal scholarship. We hope to help amplify and catalyze scholarship and pedagogy that place themes of power,
equality, and democracy at the center of legal scholarship.

authors. The authors are, respectively, William S. Beinecke Professor of Law at Columbia
Law School; Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School; Professor of Law at Yale Law School; and
Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and President, Demos. They are cofounders of
the Law & Political Economy Project. The authors thank Anne Alstott, Jack Balkin, Jessica BulmanPozen, Corinne Blalock, Angela Harris, Luke Herrine, Doug Kysar, Zach Liscow, Daniel Markovits,
Bill Novak, Frank Pasquale, Robert Post, David Pozen, Aziz Rana, Kate Redburn, Reva Siegel,
Talha Syed, John Witt, and the participants of the January 2019 Law and Political Economy Workshop at Yale Law School for their comments on drafts at many stages of the project.
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introduction
We live in a time of rolling political, economic, social, and ecological crises.
In the United States and across the world, income inequality has returned to the
levels of the Gilded Age.1 Conventional monetary policy seems unable to generate the stable and shared growth that previous generations of economists and
policymakers took for granted.2 Factors such as the weakness of labor unions,3
the increasing concentration of industry,4 and the degradation of social insurance
schemes5 have contributed to inequality and intensiﬁed precarity.6 Markers of
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (examining and documenting the rise in income inequality); David
Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 629 (2014) (reviewing PIKETTY,
supra, and noting that “there are numerous parallels between current tendencies and those of
earlier times, particularly the Gilded Age of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”); see also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 61, 64 (2017) (discussing the period between 1945 and 1973, when income inequality shrank, and associated “Golden Age optimism”).
On the difficulty of contemporary macroeconomic policy under present conditions, see EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION? RETHINKING MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION (Olivier Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers eds., 2019); and Kenneth Rogoff, Dealing
with Monetary Paralysis at the Zero Bound, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 47 (2017). See also Yair Listokin,
Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 791, 791
(2017) (arguing that the “costs associated with introducing macroeconomics into law are
worth bearing”).
See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76
AM. SOC. REV. 513, 516 (2011).
See The Problem with Proﬁts, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news
/leaders/21695392-big-ﬁrms-united-states-have-never-had-it-so-good-time-more
-competition-problem [https://perma.cc/5JGR-HKVC] (providing evidence that two-thirds
of U.S. industries “have become more concentrated since 1997”). Recent studies suggest that
the increase in concentration is hurting both wages and investment. See David Autor et al.,
The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, 135 Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2020),
https://economics.mit.edu/ﬁles/12979 [https://perma.cc/ZKN2-AF25]; José A. Azar et al.,
Concentration in U.S. Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 24395, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24395 [https://
perma.cc/XL69-QHSU]; Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and
Investment in the U.S. (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23583, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23583 [https://perma.cc/M5C4-2JDZ].
See JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2d ed. 2019).
On stagnant incomes in the United States, see Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 557 (2018). For discussions of the changing workplace and its consequences, see SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED: A NEW
STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING (2016) (regarding restaurant workers); ARNE L. KALLEBERG, PRECARIOUS LIVES: JOB INSECURITY AND WELL-BEING IN RICH DEMOCRACIES (2018);
ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND: HOW ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE RULES OF WORK
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despair, including early death, are on the rise for young and middle-aged adults
in the United States.7
This economic crisis is creating a crisis of care and social reproduction.8 Low
wages mean longer work hours, high rents mean longer commutes, and unaffordable childcare and weakening social-insurance schemes mean heavier burdens on caregivers.9 These trends are intensiﬁed, particularly among the poor
and people of color, by mass incarceration,10 misdemeanor-control policies,11

(2018) (regarding the precarity of gig economy workers); BENJAMIN H. SNYDER, THE DISRUPTED WORKPLACE: TIME AND THE MORAL ORDER OF FLEXIBLE CAPITALISM (2016); GUY
STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED
WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014) (regarding the precarity of franchised workers); and Daniel Schneider &
Kristen Harknett, Consequences of Routine Work-Schedule Instability for Worker Health and WellBeing, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 82 (2019). On the cruel ironies of conventional means of upward
mobility in conditions of severe and persistent precarity, see Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking
Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (2019).
7.
Lauren Gaydosh et al., The Depths of Despair Among U.S. Adults Entering Midlife, 109 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 774 (2019); see also Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality
in Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 15078 (2015) (documenting an increase in the all-cause mortality of white non-Hispanic
people in the United States between 1999 and 2013); Steven H. Woolf & Heidi Schoomaker,
Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in the United States, 1959-2017, 322 JAMA 1996, 1996 (2019)
(providing evidence that “[b]y 2014, midlife mortality was increasing across all racial groups,
caused by drug overdoses, alcohol abuse, suicides, and a diverse list of organ system diseases”).
8. See Nancy Fraser, Contradictions of Capitalism and Care, 100 NEW LEFT REV. 99 (2016).
9. See Helen Hester, Care Under Capitalism: The Crisis of “Women’s Work,” 24 IPPR PROGRESSIVE
REV. 343 (2018). In addition, as women move into the workforce in greater numbers, they are
less able to do unpaid work at home—a shift that does not show up in GDP and that surely
blunts the impact of economic growth as described by GDP. See Nancy Folbre et al., Women’s
Employment, Unpaid Work, and Economic Inequality, in INCOME INEQUALITY: ECONOMIC DISPARITIES AND THE MIDDLE CLASS IN AFFLUENT COUNTRIES 234 (Janet C. Gornik & Markus Jäntti eds., 2013); Nancy Folbre, Valuing Unpaid Work Matters, Especially for the Poor, N.Y.
TIMES: ECONOMIX (Sept. 21, 2009, 7:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09
/21/valuing-unpaid-work-matters-especially-for-the-poor [https://perma.cc/M5G7-9CY7].
10. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME:
THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016); see also Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race,
and Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 28 SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 35 (2014) (arguing
that we are experiencing “hyper” incarceration rather than “mass” incarceration owing to
stratiﬁcation by race, class, and gender).
11. See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL
IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018).
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penal welfare,12 and penal debt.13 Racialized violence and structural inequity
pervade the American social order, even the physical structure of our cities, and
foster unequal vulnerability to environmental problems, economic exploitation,
and physical insecurity.14
Climate change threatens to exacerbate all of these crises. It challenges our
way of life so fundamentally that it is hard to adequately conceptualize the potential harms in relation to current institutions and intellectual frameworks.15
The model of economic growth and resource extraction at the heart of today’s
capitalism is on a collision course with human existence as we have known it.16
Even short of widespread catastrophe, the costs of climate disruption will fall on
those least able to bear them.17
The political response to these problems has proven insufficient. Our democratic structures of decision-making are hollowed out.18 Government enacts the

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.

See Aya Gruber et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 FLA.
L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2016) (deﬁning penal welfare as “states’ growing practice of providing social beneﬁts through criminal court”); see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:
CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 38 (2012).
See Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation
and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090 (2017); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A POUND
OF FLESH: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE DEBT (2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites
/default/ﬁles/ﬁeld_document/022318-debtreport_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/987B-QP92].
See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP (2017) (describing the racial wealth gap and its relationship to ﬁnancial institutions and
structures); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (describing the racialized impact of police violence); JEDEDIAH PURDY, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE STRUGGLE
FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH 29-54, 76-101 (2019) (describing the pervasive intersection of
economic inequality, the built environment, and differential environmental vulnerability);
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (describing the racialized impact of urban planning).
See AMITAV GHOSH, THE GREAT DERANGEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNTHINKABLE
(2016); JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 6-7 (2015)
(discussing “environmental imagination”); Jedediah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits of
the Possible, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 289, 289-90 (2008) (proposing a “dynamic view of
political economy” to help see beyond the problem of climate change).
See, e.g., KATE ARONOFF ET AL., A PLANET TO WIN: WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL (2019)
(exploring contradictions between capitalist growth and ecological viability).
See PURDY, supra note 14, at 35-46 (discussing how “environmental vulnerability is intimately
involved in American inequality”); Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement,
44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 821-29, 858-62 (2018) (exploring distributive questions surrounding
environmental justice).
See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 150-55
(2017). In the European context, see Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, From a Deﬁcit of Democracy to a
Technocratic Order: The Postcrisis Debate on Europe, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 351, 353 (2017). For
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policy preferences of the rich over those of the majority19: political scientists
studying the problem have deemed money itself “the root of representational
inequality.”20 Citizen frustration with this intertwined and increasing concentration of economic and political power is visible on the right in the rise of the Tea
Party and the election of Donald Trump and on the left in social movements such
as Occupy and Black Lives Matter and in growing calls by prominent parts of the
Democratic Party for socialism or renewed social democracy. All of these movements express deep dissatisfaction with political elites. They manifest ordinary
people’s anger at their limited inﬂuence over both their individual lives and our
collective political future.
Together, these developments pose a deep challenge to prevailing models of
legal thought and scholarship, which have been profoundly shaped by a misconception of the relationship between politics and the economy. That misconception inhibits our ability to address urgent problems of distribution, democracy,
and ecology. Indeed, legal discourse has helped consolidate these problems by
serving as a powerful authorizing terrain for a set of “neoliberal”21 political projects that have fueled these same crises.
Although a full defense of these claims will take many pages, any ﬁrst-year
law student can appreciate the problem’s basic contours. She may begin her education imagining it as an invitation to ask fundamental questions concerning
justice and power. But she is likely to “learn” quickly that serious legal thought
in areas such as contracts and property prizes a certain version of efficiency over
all else. Meanwhile, constitutional law advances visions of equality and liberty
a global account, see CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber et al. eds.,
2018) (discussing troubled constitutional democracies throughout the world).
19. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER
IN AMERICA 1 (2012) (providing evidence that U.S. policy is “strongly tilted toward the most
affluent citizens” such that, “under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority
of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does or
doesn’t adopt”); see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy,
Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC.
152, 174 (2010) (discussing how “many Americans . . . lack conﬁdence in public officials’ willingness or ability to address [inequality] effectively”).
20. GILENS, supra note 19, at 10.
21. As used in this Feature, “neoliberalism” is “a set of recurring claims made by policymakers,
advocates, and scholars in the ongoing contest between the imperatives of market economies
and nonmarket values grounded in the requirements of democratic legitimacy.” David Singh
Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
2-3 (2014). Neoliberalism is a mode of governance and legitimation that enforces speciﬁc distributions and conﬁgurations of “market discipline” that support proﬁts and managerial
power over democratically determined social guarantees—for instance, labor market “liberalization,” erosion of unions’ role in the economy, and rollbacks of social provision. See id.
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that leave many forms of unequal power and vulnerability unchallenged or even
enshrined as constitutionally fundamental. Upper-level courses such as antitrust
and antidiscrimination law extend and consolidate the same lessons. To enter
law school today—particularly the elite law schools that send the most students
into powerful legal and political positions—is to join a conversation shaped by
the depoliticization and naturalization of market-mediated inequalities.22
The sum of these parts is a division of labor among legal ﬁelds that we dub
the “Twentieth-Century Synthesis.”23 It rests upon two interrelated developments. First, some legal subﬁelds have been reoriented around versions of economic “efficiency.” These are the ﬁelds in which law and economics has become
dominant and which are generally considered to be “about the market”: contracts, property, antitrust, intellectual property, corporate law, and so on. Here,
efficiency analysis anchors both the descriptive framing and the normative assessment of law. Efficiency itself is typically deﬁned—in practice if not always in
theory—as a kind of “wealth maximization” that works to structurally prioritize
the interests of those with more resources.24 This methodological approach offers no framework for thinking systematically about the interrelationships between political and economic power. Its commitment to summative conceptions
provides it no means to analyze, let alone counter, contemporary concentrations
of wealth and power, except insofar as they interfere with overall efficiency.25
The second move has redeﬁned so-called political and public legal ﬁelds,
centrally constitutional law. Here, questions of coercion and legitimacy remain
central but are delimited to exclude economic power and other structural forms
of inequality. Scrutiny in these ﬁelds tends to be restricted to narrowly deﬁned
differential treatment of individuals, especially by the state. As the economy was

22.

These inequalities include life-deﬁning differences in power that operate in intersectional
ways to impact health and well-being. See, e.g., RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG:
PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 28 (2007) (offering
an inﬂuential deﬁnition of racism as “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death”); NANCY KRIEGER, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND THE PEOPLE’S HEALTH: THEORY AND CONTEXT 167-201 (2011) (theorizing and
providing references to work on social epidemiology and the political economy of health).
23. One might also call it the “late twentieth-century synthesis,” since the consolidation occurs
from the 1970s onward. But, as we describe, the Synthesis is also a kind of apotheosis or apogee of the century. It is the culmination of developments that reach back to the era of laissezfaire, Progressivism, and the New Deal; and from Reconstruction to Jim Crow and the Civil
Rights Movement. We favor the broader “Twentieth-Century” term for this reason.
24. See, e.g., Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649 (2018).
25. Antitrust law and theories of monopoly provide no exception, because they too have been
reworked to focus on narrow conceptions of efficiency. See infra text accompanying notes 6063 (discussing evolution in the domain of antitrust theory).
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read out of working conceptions of constitutional equality, it was read back into
constitutional law to enshrine certain forms of economic liberty through developments in free-speech law. Meanwhile, more diffusely, pessimism about the
possibilities of politics and the effectiveness of the state rippled through our constitutional imaginary and doctrine, shaped by ways of thinking that transposed
market logics onto politics and political subjects. The result is a vision of constitutional equality and liberty that enshrines structural inequality and economic
power.26
Altogether, the Synthesis has muted problems of distribution and power
throughout public and private law. As a result, the economy has receded as a
subject in ﬁelds now reconstituted as fundamentally political, and politics has
receded as a subject in ﬁelds reconstituted as fundamentally economic.
A word is in order about how we envision the contributions of this Feature
—a sort of “How to Use This Argument” manual. We seek to map the broad
sweep of legal argument, interpret a professional culture, and bridge scholarship
and doctrine, across decades and across a variety of substantive ﬁelds. To everything we say there will be counterexamples. We have many of them in mind
ourselves. There are also many areas of law we do not discuss. We expect that
readers will be able to identify many conﬁrming examples and details from their
own ﬁelds, some outside our knowledge, others simply beyond the scope of our
drafting.
With all due caveats, we believe this argument captures essential shifts and
stakes that have constituted the legal era of the last several decades. The Twentieth-Century Synthesis makes up the air we breathe, and is the only disciplinary
atmosphere younger scholars and lawyers have known. This Synthesis was always contested, often passionately, and many tools to contest it have been built
over decades. We note some of our precedents, but they are so many and our
debt is so great that we lack the space here to acknowledge each individually.
Having said that, we also believe that—at a moment when structural and political shifts have reopened essential questions about the meaning of liberty and
equality, the relationship between the state and the economy, and the interactions between capitalism and democracy—a reassessment of legal scholarship
and its tasks is in order.
In this moment, it is newly possible to reorganize the fundamental orientations of legal scholarship. The conditions that made the regnant legal culture
halfway plausible to so many people have shifted. Its costs are now clearer. We
propose a statement of the current stakes and offer some preliminary ideas about
how we might best reconstruct legal scholarship to address the fundamental
challenges of our time. We must replace the Twentieth-Century Synthesis with

26.

See infra Section II.A.
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a different framework for legal thought. At the core of this reconstruction is a
renewed commitment to questions of political economy. With others, we have
thus begun to practice a scholarship of “law and political economy” (LPE),
rooted in a shared set of insights, concerns, and commitments.27
The term “political economy” is historically variable and contested. We do
not mean the “political economy” analysis of institutions and policies as practiced in mainstream economics departments, which turns on the application of
rational-choice models to government actors or institutions.28 Rather, we intend
the older and more foundational usage familiar to nineteenth-century audiences,
which persisted in traditions of “radical” political economy until a few decades
ago. This political economy investigates the relation of politics to the economy,
understanding that the economy is always already political in both its origins
and its consequences.
This insight was once inﬂuential among legal scholars, and indeed, received
some of its deﬁning formulations from them. The Legal Realists, in their battle
against laissez-faire ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
explained how law speciﬁes the rights, powers, and enforcement mechanisms
that constitute economic transactions and, more broadly, economic ordering.
These laws are the output of political order, making law the essential connective
tissue between political judgment and economic order.29
Attention to political economy today requires attentiveness to the ways in
which economic and political power are inextricably intertwined with racialized
and gendered inequity and subordination. Signiﬁcant critiques of the “private”
and self-sustaining economy after the realists came from feminists, who pointed
27.

One useful place to access the work of other scholars and advocates engaged in this practice is
the Law & Political Economy blog, founded in 2017 by a group of faculty and students, including the authors, who were keen to renew a political-economy approach in legal scholarship.
This Feature is indebted to the insights of these students and the blog’s many contributors,
as well as legal scholars and activists associated with the Association for the Promotion of
Political Economy and the Law (APPEAL) and the Journal of Law and Political Economy
(JLPE). For additional perspectives on the LPE approach and a description of an associated
new casebook, see Martha T. McCluskey et al., Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches,
35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297 (2016). We also acknowledge the support of the Hewlett Foundation, which has permitted us to launch a new “Law and Political Economy Project,” housed
at Yale Law School.
28. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy, 21
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 324, 324 (1992) (“The term political economy, once synonymous with economics, now generally refers either to the study of the interface between economy and state
or to the application of models of rational choice to the analysis of state decision-making.”).
29. On the relation to the older “institutional” political economy and what it could mean for legal
scholarship, see Simon Deakin et al., Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role
of Law, 45 J. COMP. ECON. 188 (2017); and Grewal, supra note 1.
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out that the productive circuits of capitalism relied upon reproductive labor done
largely by women—labor that was uncompensated and thus not captured in
foundational economic measures such as GDP (and, arguably, unable to be adequately appreciated in terms of conventional political economy or its measurement of exchange value).30 Scholars focused on racial subordination have
worked for decades to theorize the way that the state gives force to nominally
private racism by selectively enabling certain kinds of choice. More recently, theorists of the “carceral state” have highlighted the role that criminal law plays in
regulating markets and market subjects.31 Nonetheless, criminal law is conventionally understood apart from legal ﬁelds that address “the economy.” Unfortunately, these problems have been effectively obscured by separating the ﬁelds
focused on these domains as not about economy at all.
Despite decades of telling criticism, “the economy” has become a kind of unquestioned foundation or backdrop of law, policy, and politics in modern intellectual and mainstream political discourse. Whatever it touches has been treated
as susceptible to technical management but not to political judgment. In parallel,
places where political or moral judgment predominate are assumed not to be
spaces of economic ordering. How were the lessons of legal realism elided and
lessons of other critical legal traditions resisted? How were so many issues of
justice recast as something other than political-economy questions? And in what
ways has the consolidation of neoliberalism established a set of new problems
that the realists and critical legal scholars did not confront?
We explore these questions in Part II, explicating the two moves important
to the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, and the features of law and economics (for
example, its claims to tractability and neutrality) that provided some of its appeal. We end with reference to the broad historical background that is essential
to understanding the fragile success of the Synthesis. That background includes
the exceptional economic conditions of the postwar “trente glorieuses”; the neoliberal age’s multivalent retreat from the political; and an urgent set of emer-

30.

SYLVIA FEDERICI, The Reproduction of Labor Power in the Global Economy and the Unﬁnished
Feminist Revolution, in REVOLUTION AT POINT ZERO: HOUSEWORK, REPRODUCTION, AND FEMINIST STRUGGLE 91 (2012); Nancy Fraser, Crisis of Care? On the Social-Reproductive Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism, in SOCIAL REPRODUCTION THEORY: REMAPPING CLASS, RECENTERING OPPRESSION 21 (Tithi Bhattacharya ed., 2017); see also Folbre et al., supra note 9.
31. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH
OF NATURAL ORDER (2011); Loïc Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare,
and Social Insecurity, 25 SOC. F. 197 (2010); Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to
Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927 (2016).
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gent questions that seemed, especially in a time of regnant neoliberalism, to require redress via “recognition,” rather than “redistribution.”32 The well-funded
and organized promotion of law and economics mattered too, as did its interconnection with an increasingly conservative and activist judiciary.33
The crises of today challenge this fragile Synthesis and make vivid the denial
of democracy that it implies. These same developments have also rejuvenated
reconsideration of the relationship between questions of distribution and matters of inclusion, citizenship, and democracy, on both left and right. Part III explores a series of questions that might connect critical scholarship, past and present. What might a mode of legal analysis that took the political nature of the
economy seriously look like? What questions would it foreground, and how
would it address them? We offer a possible set of broad reorientations: from the
analysis of efficiency to the analysis of power, from the pursuit of neutrality to
the pursuit of equality, and from the antipolitics of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis to a candid and risky embrace of democracy.
i. the twentieth-century synthesis
Beginning in the 1970s, but drawing from developments in the laissez-faire
era and earlier, a new division of labor in legal thought coalesced into what we
call the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. It consisted of two interrelated moves.
First, in ﬁelds denoted as about “the economy,” the rise of law and economics
centered efficiency and sidelined questions of distribution, power, and democracy. Second, in ﬁelds understood as more “political”—ﬁelds including constitutional law, for example—a parallel set of moves worked to render economic
power hard to ﬁnd and correct: it was background and not foreground, allowed
to operate according to its own ostensible rules and protected in various ways
from democratic reordering. The success of this Synthesis has never been complete, always fragile. Dissenting voices have contested these intellectual and political developments along the way and done a great deal to highlight some of
their problems. Despite this, the landscape of legal thought shifted decisively,
setting the stage for our new Gilded Age.

32.

See NANCY FRASER, FORTUNES OF FEMINISM: FROM STATE-MANAGED CAPITALISM TO NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 227-43 (2013) (describing and theorizing differences between recognition and redistribution). See generally NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003).
33. See infra Section II.C.
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A. The Autonomy of the Economy
The ﬁrst move of the Synthesis can be best understood by charting the rise
in the 1970s and 1980s of modern law and economics, an intellectual enterprise
that approached law using the tools of neoclassical economics.34 Law and economics represented a return to the ideal of what we call the “autonomy of the
economy,” familiar in laissez-faire thinking, but with a twist.
Laissez-faire thought envisioned the economy as a self-subsistent domain of
freedom, in which individuals could organize their affairs through a few relatively simple principles of property and contract. It found legal expression in
cases such as Lochner v. New York35 and Hammer v. Dagenhart.36 In legal culture,
laissez-faire advocates argued both that the U.S. Constitution sharply constrained the ability of democratic majorities to “interfere in economic matters”37
and that this was good because markets were a domain of freedom where—as
marginal productivity theory had ostensibly revealed—all were rewarded “in
proportion to their just deserts.”38 Legal realists, over decades of trenchant cri-

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

For a discussion of the ﬁrst law-and-economics movement, which operated quite differently
than the law and economics of the 1970s and 1980s, see BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE
ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT
(1998).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
247 U.S. 251 (1918). For more on laissez-faire, see FRIED, supra note 34. The theoretical backdrop to this image has been some blend of a natural-rights theory (sometimes traced to John
Locke, though commerce was not much of his concern) in which economic life is organized
in a Lego-like way by individuals linking up their property rights (including property in their
own labor) through the hinges and rivets of contract and a more psychological and protosociological theory that treats property and exchange as emerging spontaneously from the reciprocal relations of social animals, as set out by Adam Smith, David Hume, and others. The
theoretical premises of these accounts have tended not to matter much in what one might
think of as their ideological work, as they coincide in imparting an image of naturalness and
harmony to an idealized picture of market relations. In this, such traditions all enact a form
of antipolitics. What unites them is their rationalization of a set of limits on, and speciﬁc instructions for, the deployment of state power to shape economic and social life: limits against
“interference” with market distributions and relations, and instructions for organizing those
relations through the law.
FRIED, supra note 34, at 1.
Id. at 2. Decades of scholarship have enriched our picture of the origins of Lochner and the
legal culture that surrounded it, whose inﬂuences included Jacksonian antimonopoly politics,
the free-labor ideology of the Republican Party before and after the Civil War, and the emerging culture of corporate legal practice in the Gilded Age. See, e.g., 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN
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tique, eventually buoyed by political victory in the New Deal, elevated an explicitly functionalist account of law as serving varying social aims rather than embodying perennial and abstract concepts.39 They also showed that law is never
absent from economic life but rather generates the order of rights that market
advocates invoke to defend the boundaries of the economy.40 Most fundamentally, in response to the laissez-faire claim that markets could and should be free
from state coercion, they showed that legally constituted and distributed coercion is the sine qua non of market relations.41
Steeped in the realist skepticism of formalism, law and economics embraced
law as a functional and instrumental domain and even embraced the realization
that law makes markets.42 But it deﬁned law’s goals and methods in a manner
that demanded a new kind of rule of the market. It argued for what we might
call “market supremacy,” or the necessary subordination of the political to the
economic. And along the way, this inheritor of legal realism abandoned the concern with economic life’s character as a site of struggle amid unequal power. It
gave up the urgency of both criticizing coercion and inequality and asking how
they might be justiﬁed, if at all.
Three theories are key to the market supremacy model of law and economics.
First is the elevation of efficiency—and more particularly, “wealth maximization”—as a value to guide decisionmakers. Wealth maximization is the theory
that law should be oriented to ensure the greatest aggregate “wealth,” or the
greatest “total consumer and producer surplus generated by those goods and
services” in the economy.43 The problems with wealth maximization as a moral

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

STATE, 1888-1910, at 3-21 (1993) (arguing for the ideological and historical complexity of laissez-faire jurisprudence); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1-18 (1993) (surveying methodological and substantive approaches to Lochner-era jurisprudence); Jack M. Balkin, Wrong the
Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005) (tracing
and assessing efforts to relate laissez-faire jurisprudence to constitutional canon and anticanon); see also WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (documenting, in the state and common law of nineteenth-century America, a distinctive logic of shared obligations and public duties).
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935).
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 534-35 (1988) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470 (1923).
See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831,
832-34 (2008) (casting legal realism as the use of social-science analysis to reveal biases in
judges administering administrative law doctrines).
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60 (1981).
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matter are many and by now quite well understood. To offer just one salient example, it would be “wealth maximizing” to take bread from a poor man in order
to forcibly transfer it to a rich man, even when the former is starving and the
latter merely peckish, as long as the latter is “willing”—because he is able—to
pay more.44 Wealth maximization thus enacts a “willingness to pay” principle—
it demands that goods move to those with the highest willingness to pay,
whether or not they have in fact paid, and with no requirement that the move
increases utility or welfare.45 Few ﬁnd that appealing, and few today in fact defend wealth maximization as a normative theory.46 In practice, however, law and
economics almost invariably reverts to wealth maximization as a criterion, because costs and beneﬁts are both hard to measure, and transfers (if ever actualized) hard to achieve, without a common denominator like money.47
Elevating efficiency as a value also marginalized questions of distribution, so
that the law of economic exchange was itself “encased,” protected from distributive or other political demands beyond the demand for efficiency itself.48 The
Coase Theorem as commonly understood, for example, not only entrenches

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.

For formative critiques that point out this problem, among others, see DANIEL M. HASUMAN
& MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(2d ed. 2006); Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998); and Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). In a folk
sense, the idea has some appeal, because it is assumed to be growing the economic pie in a
manner that can later be redistributed. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
See Liscow, supra note 24, at 1658-59.
See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 5 (2002). Richard
Posner claimed to move toward a “common sense” economic libertarianism, while other leading law-and-economics scholars instead retreated—in theory—to the criterion of welfare
maximization. See Richard Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166
(1990) (defending “economic libertarian views” not as a matter of philosophy, because philosophy was a “weak ﬁeld, a ﬁeld in disarray, a ﬁeld in which consensus is impossible to
achieve in our society,” but because “the minimum state deﬁned by the economic analysis of
market failure is the state that works best to achieve the common goals of most people in the
world”).
See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 46, at 32 n.34 (noting the need for a common denominator for costs and beneﬁts and acknowledging that “[i]n law and economics writing, this
denominator is usually money”); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 14-16 (2010) (making a similar point).
For the terminology of “encasement,” see QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM 5-7, 13 (2018). This is similar to the process described
as “depoliticization” (which is achieved through a political commitment to take something
out of politics), as described by WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 46 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014).
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ideas about efficiency but also obscures matters of distribution and initial endowment.49 As a framing device, the Theorem effaces the otherwise inescapable
nub of the problem: who wins and who loses, and who may do what to whom?
The former was ruled irrelevant, and a near-nihilistic response was given to the
latter: it does not matter where law places the entitlement, for the market will
determine where it belongs.50 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s “double distortion” argument represents the most sophisticated expression of the marginalization of issues of distribution. They purport to establish that legal entitlements should always be designed to maximize efficiency, shunting issues of
distribution elsewhere (commonly, to the tax code), lest production suffer two
shortcomings rather than just one.51 Here too, sophisticated critiques both revealed the many problems with this account and failed to stem its inﬂuence.52
The second and third theories—externalities and “transaction costs”—serve
to bridge the core account of the market in neoclassical economics, as articulated
in general equilibrium theory, with the traditional institutional focus of law. Beyond their common usage, these theories operationalize a neoclassical conception of the market and its purposes in post-realist legal analysis.53 Externalities
are features of a transaction or economic process that are “external” to it, and
49.

50.

51.
52.

53.

Its chief lesson is commonly said to be that it does not matter to efficiency where a legal entitlement goes if transaction costs are low. Framed that way, the decisive distributive effects of
entitlement allocation disappear as an issue. In our experience, incoming law students often
present an instructive reality test. Despite their general eagerness to adopt and adapt to the
novel norms of legal reasoning, they tend to see Coase’s arguments as weirdly artiﬁcial and
beside the point. They reassert ideas of fairness about who does what to whom and are sincerely baffled by the indifference to distributive outcomes, often expressing the thought that
they must themselves be missing something, as Coase could hardly be so eminent if he failed
to engage meaningfully with such an important issue. In the end, many grudgingly accept
that “This Is Important,” while some, having got the knack of the linking theories, eagerly
deploy them for the rest of the ﬁrst year.
Or, with more sophistication: if transaction costs are high, the entitlement should be allocated
to produce the most efficient result, with efficiency deﬁned in terms that themselves carry a
distributive bias.
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
Among these criticisms, see Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 511, 519-23 (2004); and Zachary
Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2478-83 (2014).
The original neoclassical conception of the market is formalized in F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS (1881). For a modern deﬁnition of neoclassical economics by an advocate of
the theory, see E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, LIBR. ECON. LIBERTY, https://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html
[https://perma.cc/A7VG
-PN9B].
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thus are not priced through the market or otherwise accounted for.54 Externality
is often treated as a problem of “market failure,” whether a failure within a particular market to make some costs “internal” to the relevant agents or the outright absence of any relevant market.55 Transaction costs are costs of market exchange: of locating parties; negotiating deals; overcoming strategic bargaining
problems; and, in some cases, supporting the institutions required to enable
transactions. The concept was ﬁrst used by Ronald Coase to explain why ﬁrms
pursue certain tasks through internal hierarchies—bosses and supervisors giving
orders to workers—rather than do everything through market contracts.56 This
same logic was then extended to rationalize all forms of command that coexist
with contract: the question was always whether hierarchical command costs less
on net than market contracting, once the transaction costs of the latter were
taken into account. Various features of institutional life could thus be homogenized into one capacious concept that also helped to naturalize market exchange:
as long as transaction costs were low, Coase implied, it could be assumed that
entitlements would naturally ﬂow to their “best” or “highest value” use through
voluntary exchange. Where they were high, planners could reengineer entitlements to approximate the most efficient (i.e., hypothetical market) outcome.
This assumption epitomizes law and economics: it simultaneously recognizes
and embraces the fact that law makes markets, while demanding that the satisfaction of markets becomes the aim of politics.
Law and economics, elevated amid the antiplanning rhetoric of the Chicago
school, was inevitably itself a form of planning. Planning was essential if politics
was to serve the goal of efficiency, precisely because “transaction costs” and “externalities” meant that efficiency in many cases required redesigning the market.
The role of scholarship was to identify transaction costs and externalities (and,

54.

See ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 169-71, 197 (1994) (noting
that “external” is used to describe a situation in which some relevant activity is outside the
unit of account, whether a household, ﬁrm, organization, some aggregate of these, or even
the economic system altogether, and used to describe an activity that is inefficient with respect
to some speciﬁed objective function, such as Pareto optimality). A standard example is when
water pollution from a factory affects downstream users who have no control over and cannot
readily transact with the upstream owner’s decisions.
55. Kenneth Arrow, Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities, in THE
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTPUT 1, 1-2 (Julius Margolis ed., 1970); Walter P. Heller & David A.
Starrett, On the Nature of Externalities, in THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 9, 9-10 (Steven A.Y. Lin ed., 1976).
56. Coase recuperated this as a response to the efficiency mandate by theorizing that ﬁrms would
emerge whenever the costs of market transaction were higher than the cost of internalizing
decisions into a command structure. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
395 (1937).
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in the public-choice vein, motives and opportunities for rent seeking) and to
recommend a shift in entitlements. The agent of law reform imagined here was
not the people but the technician: the judge, economist, or bureaucrat who
would calculate hypothetical consumer and producer surplus to order law and
policy to serve the aims of wealth maximization. Transaction costs also became
the central means of describing why externalities exist and persist: markets do
not internalize some values because the “costs” of internalizing them are too
high. Transaction costs and externalities became the centerpiece of modern law
and economics, bridging the gaps between neoclassical economic theory and
problems of private law.57
Wealth maximization, transaction costs, and externalities have served as
“linking theories” that connect analysis of legal rules and institutions with the
general equilibrium model of neoclassical economics. These theories rationalize
legal institutions (with their inevitable basis in coercion) against the backdrop
of a sophisticated account of perfect markets. For example, the theory of externalities redescribes domains that might have been conceived as part of the market’s “outside” as part of a comprehensive theoretical “inside.” Transaction-cost
analysis rationalizes nonmarket institutional development and political conﬂict
over and within market orderings as a kind of “friction” to be minimized. Both
have the effect of reorienting the normative assessment of markets and their consequences to an ultimately self-valorizing standard, wealth maximization, that
assumes the social good is generally achieved through the maximization of market transaction.58 They translate an abstract but mathematically elegant account,
in which questions of coercion and distribution play no formal part, into a set of
rougher and more fragmentary, but conveniently modular, moves that constitute
the “law-and-economics” method and can be deployed across a variety of ﬁelds
of law. Their combined effect is to make market ordering central and seemingly
inevitable by grounding legal analysis in neoclassical descriptive and justiﬁcatory
concepts. Through these linking theories, law and economics has developed into
the “normal science” familiar to legal academics today. Among the achievements
of law and economics has been its claim to analytic tractability (using externalities
and transaction-cost analysis to make progress possible on questions about how
law should be ordered) and a form of neutrality (using efficiency as a principle to
make social decisions that ostensibly make everyone better off ).

57.
58.

See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1960).
Sophisticated critics have shown that this is more rhetoric than reality. As with other forms of
capitalism, neoliberalism in fact relies on certain institutions remaining outside the formal
market, for example in order to perform—under extractive conditions—the work of social
reproduction. On this, see, for example, MELINDA COOPER, FAMILY VALUES (2016); and Fraser,
supra note 8.
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B. The Law of the Economy Remade
The many criticisms of this way of reasoning did not halt the inﬂuence of
modern law and economics in legal thought. Law and economics spanned substantive areas of law, delivering a simplicity and method that any ﬁrst-year student could learn and that a wave of dedicated scholarship on alternative ﬁeldspeciﬁc idioms did little to displace. The result was far from a comprehensive
defense of market ordering, much less one that overcame the many telling criticisms of the normative case for law and economics that issued in the 1980s.59
Nonetheless, adherents of law and economics reorganized an array of legal ﬁelds.
They did so using a variety of argument types, sometimes shifting among them.
Arguments that idealize a version of market ordering as neutral and “good for us
all,” which would characterize the elevation of consumer welfare in antitrust law
or efficiency reasoning in intellectual property, are market fundamentalist. Arguments to the effect that the state simply cannot be trusted to make substantive
judgments about value and distribution on account of the dynamics revealed by
public-choice theory take the form of market tragedy. Here, market-modeled insight reveals that the market is the best we can do, perhaps regrettably but ineluctably nonetheless. This style of argument persistently accompanied the more
optimistic market-fundamentalist moves, enabling scholars and advocates to insist without fear of contradiction that economic policy deviating from market
models would invite rent seeking. The combination of the ﬁrst two supported a
third, subtler style of argument: market hegemony simply assumed that “serious”
law and policy thinking would adhere to market models, as in environmental
law’s focus on cost engineering to the exclusion of infrastructure investment and
political engagement. The latter kinds of proposals simply have no place at the
table, and raising them suggests the discrediting failure to understand that market reasoning provides the authoritative and exclusive way of engaging urgent
questions.
Antitrust law, our ﬁrst example, was remade to address a drastically narrowed conception of the problem of monopoly.60 Market power was to be disciplined only when it interfered with consumer welfare, and sometimes, still more
59.
60.

For examples of these criticisms, see Kennedy, supra note 44; and Dworkin, supra note 44.
See, e.g., Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 43-54) (describing Robert Bork’s narrowed conception of antitrust’s aims); Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust History Revisited, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1655
(2020) (reviewing TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
(2018)); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 717-22 (2017)
[hereinafter Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox].
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narrowly, only when it increased prices.61 Historically, antitrust law and scholarship took a broader view: it emerged from a concern about the power of large
corporate entities to inﬂuence politics and not just prices, and imposed structural
limits and bright-line rules to guard against an array of possible political-economic implications of ﬁrm dominance.62 Replacing this political-economic version of antitrust, the ﬁeld came to target a much narrower conception of market
collusion. The result is a regime that privileges ﬁrms as favored instances of (vertical) coordination but repudiates certain forms of (horizontal) coordination
among market participants and certain workers (such as independent contractors).63 In the name of supposed efficiency, antitrust now blesses mergers and
big ﬁrms but restrains cooperation among Uber drivers and church organists.64
This remade antitrust law has in turn helped to remake the corporate world, facilitating the substantial new forms of market concentration and priority for capital over labor that we previewed above.
Intellectual-property law is another ﬁeld that was remade—indeed, made—
by law-and-economics thinking. The term “intellectual property” itself was
hardly used before the 1960s, and its use exploded only in the 1980s and 1990s.65
“Intellectual property” gathers together distinct legal regimes under the banner
of information production. These regimes were once thought to be about scientiﬁc and technical advancement (patent), the cultivation of learning and culture
(copyright), and the enforcement of standards of commercial morality (trademark and trade secrets). Each of these ﬁelds responded to a set of distinctive
institutional contexts and sought to promote forms of ﬂourishing that were
measured against distinctive political values. But economic thinking—the notion
that information has “public goods” qualities of nonrivalry and nonexcludability—joined these radically different legal regimes together into one subject and
rendered the pursuit of efficiency their aim. It inaugurated a new language for
debating the contours of these laws and redescribing some of their features in a
manner that empowered rightsholders.

61.

Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 60, at 720-21.
Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 980-81
(2019); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 236-37 (2017).
63. Paul, supra note 60, at 13-14.
64. Id. at 16, 34.
65. See William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership
of Ideas in the United States 22 n.105 (unpublished manuscript), https://cyber.harvard.edu
/people/tﬁsher/iphistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZL2-F8QR].
62.
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Leading law-and-economics scholars tended—especially early on—to presume that stronger rights were good, applying a simplistic version of the command to internalize externalities, rather than any sophisticated analysis of information economics.66 Critics concerned with overpropertization came to argue
against these claims in the same efficiency-oriented register, in ways that subtly
but consequentially shaped the debate and the law. The most powerful argument
for “fair use,” for example—the doctrine in copyright law that permits copying
for criticism, commentary, and educational uses—became the argument that it
resolved “market failures.”67 Transaction costs were assumed to be the measure
of the reach of this critical public safeguard, and a statute that marked out a set
of uses that had much more to do with democratic citizenship and distribution
was slowly (and, we might say, undemocratically) rendered responsive to arguments from efficiency.68 In a host of other domains, too, the law of intellectual
property was subtly revised under the sign of a set of claims about efficiency, in
66.

For example, law-and-economics scholars like Richard Posner, William Landes, and Richard
Epstein strongly argued for the need to expand intellectual-property law to internalize the
externalities of information production. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 403-19 (2003); Richard A. Epstein,
The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary,
62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457-59 (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325-26 (1989).
67. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610-12 (1982).
68. The result was a law that strongly protected certain privileged “transformative” uses because
they were assumed to be subject of transactional failures. See Clark D. Asay, Is Transformative
Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (charting the growing importance
of transformation as a fair use criterion). Google was a great driver and recipient of this doctrine, winning a series of cases that legitimated its copious copying on the grounds that its
new industrial uses were “transformative.” See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d
202, 216-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (concluding that Google’s digitization of books, combined with a
search functionality and the display of “snippets,” was transformative and a fair use); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Google’s use
of “thumbnail” images for image search was “signiﬁcant[ly] transformative” and a fair use).
At the same time, reproductive uses (one might say socially reproductive uses), such as those
in educational settings, were deemed unlawful without payment because the notion was lost
that our law held commitments to education, including distributive commitments that militated against payment, that were not subject to the dictates of efficiency analysis. See Rebecca
Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It,
114 YALE L.J. 535, 556 (2004) (noting how the transformative-use doctrine undermined educational copyright, which was increasingly rejected as “pure copying”). For more examples of
the way that market-supremacist ideas helped reconﬁgure law and so enable growing corporate power in the age of informational capitalism, see JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND
POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 15-47 (2019); and Amy
Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (reviewing
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019) and COHEN, supra).
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ways that empowered corporate owners of intellectual property over workers
and consumers and set the stage for today’s extraordinary forms of platform
power.69
Environmental law was also transformed, with enormous and perhaps irreparable consequences for the planet. The ﬁeld emerged from a long history of
legislation over public lands and natural resources that had always been closely
engaged in questions of public value and collective identity: it was generally understood that making a landscape was part of making a nation.70 Modern environmental law, constructed in a wave of legislation between 1970 and 1977, began amid legislative and popular debate over fundamental questions of political
economy: what kind of human ﬂourishing could be compatible with the ﬂourishing of the larger living world?71 By the 1980s, however, both scholarship and
policy were increasingly bound to public-choice models of legislation and costbeneﬁt assessment of policy.72 In recent decades, the looming climate crisis has
met with scholarship and political initiatives shaped by the dominance of economic method: meditations on the public-choice challenges to climate action,
or—at the outer limits of what we could be supposed to achieve—proposals to
change the cost structure of the economy through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade
initiative.73 Such scholarship is admirable in its constructive aim to guide a basic
reorientation of the economy. But, it has steadily avoided the demand for massive public investment and reconstruction of infrastructure that characterized

69.

See Kapczynski, supra note 68, at 40-49.
See PURDY, supra note 15, at 7-9 (summarizing substantive political and social visions associated with historical developments in environmental law).
71. See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy,
119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1174-90 (2010) (discussing the wealth of normative visions involved in the
environmental legislation of the late 1960s and early 1970s).
72. See infra notes 101-104 (tracing these developments); see also THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY
WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH
20-43 (2008) (discussing the political drivers of cost-beneﬁt analysis in environmental and
public-health policy); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-1973, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29 (1998) (surveying methodological developments in the ﬁeld).
73. See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY:
BEYOND KYOTO (2003) (concentrating on the interest-mediating structure of projected global
climate policy); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate
Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 129-30 (2008) (foregrounding economically rational
incentives and lumping moral and otherwise other-regarding motives into a residual category); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per
Capita Basis?, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 86-92 (2009) (arguing that the incentives of self-interested
nation-states should be regarded as an intractable constraint on distributive politics of climate
policy).
70.
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earlier interventions as fundamental as this one and that have emerged as necessary to any rapid transition to a sustainable economy.74 It has also avoided engagement with the fundamental questions of value that are necessarily implied
in political judgments about what should count as “costs” and “beneﬁts” in a
reconstruction of the economy that is, by virtue of climate dynamics, also a
global reconstruction of the natural world.75 Most fundamentally, it has also obscured from view the kinds of political mobilization that are essential for engaging these fundamental questions.
In a host of other ﬁelds, similar moves have been made with varying degrees
of success. In civil procedure, law and economics led to reforms, often at the state
level, that reined in the plaintiffs’ bar, limited class-action lawsuits, and empowered judicial “managerialism”76 and, more recently, arbitration.77 In corporate
law, the shift to an ideal of shareholder-value maximization, while not legally
required, became hegemonic.78 In international economic law, a neoliberal conception of cross-border activity gradually became dominant, institutionalized in
the immediate post-Cold War context in new trade and investment treaties that
served to limit the possibility of political interference with cross-border economic activity.79
In ﬁelds where law and economics came to dominate, it helped to turn legal
scholars’ attention persistently to certain questions. Law and economics centered
the identiﬁcation and elimination of transaction costs, channeling the Paretian
utopia of Ronald Coase’s famous frictionless plane of exchange—a kind of
heaven, not of legal concepts (as Felix Cohen had wryly described classical legal
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

See PURDY, supra note 14, at 83-101 (discussing the infrastructure demands of meaningful climate policy).
See KYSAR, supra note 47, at 1-16 (discussing the inseparability of basic questions of value from
environmental policy).
See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 386-413 (1982) (deﬁning and describing the move to managerialism in judging).
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2836-47 (2015).
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). For critiques, see K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public
Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1682-87 (2018); and Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking
on “Shareholder Primacy,” ACCT. ECON. & L., June 2012, Article 4, at 1.
For descriptions and critiques, see generally ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011); SLOBODIAN, supra note
48; and David Singh Grewal, Three Theses on the Current Crisis of International Liberalism, 25
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 595, 595 (2018) (“The turn to neoliberalism involves a shift from
the inter-state orientation that characterized the ﬁrst decades of international liberalism to a
‘dialectic of globalization[]’ . . . .”).
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liberalism) but of general equilibrium. The emphasis on externalities reframed
the conﬂict among competing interests that had properly struck realists as central to law’s concerns as a failure of accounting or pricing, a failure in properly
rendering the boundaries of a potential transaction. Coase’s point that a householder can harm a factory by reducing its proﬁts just as a polluting factory can
harm a downwind householder was familiar, of course, from Hale’s description
of all exchange as mutual coercion. The difference was that law and economics
recast this relativizing not as the starting point for a judgment about power and
legitimacy but as a nonproblem. We lost the ability to see certain commitments
in our law—whether educational exceptions to copyright law, or commitments
to clean air—as either reﬂecting or calling forth certain kinds of political values,
or as taking a side in disputes that were inevitably struggles for power. That
move, of course, was not neutral. It expressed a particular view of power and
legitimacy, one that viewed market ordering as tending to diffuse and neutralize
power and as earning legitimacy by producing both a wealthy society and an
appropriately constrained state.
C. The Twentieth-Century Synthesis Comes to Maturity
What we call the Twentieth-Century Synthesis put this account of economic
life at the center of both “economic” and “political” legal scholarship and doctrine. One set of legal subﬁelds came to be treated as “about the economy,” where
the goal of scholarship and policy was to overcome inefficiencies and press toward wealth-maximizing outcomes. In parallel, in areas regarded as “essentially
about” the liberty and equality of citizens, the last half-century has seen withdrawal from questions of economic distribution and structural coercion.
In “economic” law, the Synthesis took form through a series of legal-theoretic moves that aimed at the fragmentary implementation of aspects of general
equilibrium theory. As we will describe below, these were successful only because
they both tracked the institutional developments of the American economy during the neoliberal transformation and had essential affinities with the liberal values of personal freedom and state neutrality. Nonetheless, their genealogy is essentially one of economics-informed legal theory, and their power is rooted in
the status of microeconomic rationality and general equilibrium theory as the
master platform of “hard” social science.
In the public-law half of the Synthesis, the situation is very different. Here,
as the postwar decades gave way to the neoliberal era, law and economics did
little formal work. Instead, public law took a new shape around a particularly
thin version of key liberal values: freedom, equality, and state neutrality. Consti-
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tutional law is emblematic of this development, and we focus much of our attention there.80 Whereas in economic law the Synthesis was driven by scholars
working in an inﬂuential and often well-funded network, here the decisions of
increasingly conservative judges drove the change, and scholarship was often reactive or critical, trying to eke out what little space remained for a robust egalitarianism, even as that space narrowed.
These developments produced a consistent pattern: encasing economic and
other structural forms of inequality from answerability to the principle of equality; identifying liberty with certain forms of market participation; and assimilating the political activity of democracy to market paradigms, by turn celebrating
a commercialized public sphere as a paragon of self-rule and denigrating the actions of actual government institutions as interest-group capture and entrenchment. The courts produced, and scholarship adapted to, a denuded and distorted
version of liberalism, one unable to demand or defend the institutional arrangements necessary for robust conceptions of liberty or equality.
The encasement of markets and the assimilation of political activity to market activity can be seen in three emblematic moves of modern constitutional law.
Each of these moves helped recast issues of justice as something other than political economy questions. First is an account of constitutional equality that exiled
matters of class and material, structural inequality from the reach of constitutional law. Second is an expansion of the conception of First Amendment-protected “speech” to encompass certain economic transactions, including protecting advertising, campaign spending, and even the sale of data from regulation.
Third is an aggressive application of public-choice theory’s market-modeled
skepticism of the state to legislation and administrative regulation. These together form an encasement of economic power in the constitutional realm, tending altogether to render democracy subject to the market, rather than subjecting
the market to democratic rule.
The ﬁrst key move on the public-law side of the Synthesis was to render material and structural inequality irrelevant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s principles of equal protection and personal liberty. This was not foreordained.
The Court in the 1940s applied elevated equal-protection review to laws falling disproportionately on the poor and described union membership as a “fundamental right” in its ruling upholding the National Labor Relations Act.81 In
80.

A complete picture of the transformation of public law under the Synthesis will, however,
require accounts of many areas of law. We advert to some of these, including antitrust, antidiscrimination law, civil procedure, labor law, and environmental law. Other scholars, we
hope, will ﬁll out and add to these accounts.
81. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (applying equal-protection review to state sterilization
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the 1970s, with the increasingly conservative turn of the Court, those possibilities were cut off in favor of a denial that constitutional liberty and equality had
implications for political economy. The result was the constitutional erasure of
the structural subordination of the poor, people of color, and women.
Two steps were key here. First, despite efforts to constitutionalize welfare
rights in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court held that public-beneﬁts legislation was discretionary and refused scrutiny for poverty as a class, arguing that
it was not susceptible to such sharply delineated formal inquiry.82 When individuals argued that their ability to exercise their constitutional rights was pertinent to the constitutional obligations of the state—for example, when women
argued that the state could not constitutionally subsidize childbirth without also
subsidizing abortion, or plaintiffs asserted that low funding levels for public
schools in high-poverty districts denied students the material basis for exercising
the rights to speak and vote—the Court demurred.83 Just when the achievement
of formal equality meant that the major threats to an egalitarian society lay in
structural inequality, the Court approved policies that compounded inherited
forms of inequality, permitting education funding to vary in proportion to municipal wealth, and the access-to-abortion right to depend on having the money
to exercise it.
Second, the Court encased forms of private, material power by rejecting
heightened equal-protection review of policies that predictably and persistently
reproduced underlying patterns of economic, racial, and gender inequality.84 In
this way, the Court determined that education, public hiring, and criminal-justice policies could reproduce and even amplify social and economic inequality as
law); Brishen Rogers, Three Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 177, 197-98 (2016) (challenging the boundary between political and economic activity in the context of labor unions).
82. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973) (holding that the poor are
not a suspect class in the education context); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86
(1970) (applying the rational-basis test to state economic and social policies).
83. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297-98 (1980) (abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
464-65 (1977) (abortion); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 1-2 (education); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (housing). In the 1960s, the Court had taken a decidedly
different approach. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax on equal-protection grounds); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963)
(establishing a right to counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases). The 1970s was the
key inﬂection point, where “a new form of economic libertarianism (sometimes called neoliberalism) became dominant, and Supreme Court decisionmaking turned in a decidedly
more conservative direction.” Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 1, 5-6
(2018). For an argument that class-related concerns did not disappear but were instead woven
into substantive due-process cases in more muted form, see id. at 7-16.
84. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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long as they did not intentionally treat individuals differently on the basis of a
forbidden characteristic. Yet it is precisely the deﬁning character of structural
inequality that it persists independently of individually disparate treatment.85 A
conception of equality that ignored material deprivation and focused on improper intent encased the most pressing sources of inequality from constitutional review, even when they were reproduced and ampliﬁed by state action, and went
so far as to invalidate policies that sought to mitigate structural inequality by
taking explicit account of characteristics such as race.86 In time the Court came
to forbid all but the narrowest forms of affirmative—and even remedial—action.87 Congress’s own power to remedy discrimination was also curtailed, with
the Court insisting that even an amendment that expressly granted Congress
power to intervene in private acts of subordination did not authorize a signiﬁcantly more expansive view of what it means to live in equality than the courts
themselves were willing to impose.88 This jurisprudence eclipsed the older view
that a conception of citizenship had to be in part a material conception, concerning both distribution and the structure of power within economic relations (such
as that enshrined in collective bargaining or antitrust) appropriate to a self-governing community of equals.
A second deﬁning public-law move in the Synthesis was the merging of First
Amendment speech with commerce, speciﬁcally with certain commercial transactions. This included invalidating laws that limited private spending or donation to electoral campaigns;89 regulations on advertising (for instance, of alcohol

85.

86.

87.

88.
89.

See id. (concluding that constitutional equal-protection claims could not be based upon disparate impact theories); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-15 (1987) (rejecting
evidence of racial disparity in capital sentencing, and noting that it would open the door to
widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing). The Court also adopted an extraordinarily narrow deﬁnition of what it means to act on the basis of a suspect classiﬁcation.
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (adopting a highly formalistic understanding of when a legislature acts “because of” sex, and ﬁnding that a veteran’s preference
that selected for ninety-eight percent men was not sex-classiﬁcatory and did not reveal an
intent to discriminate on the basis of sex).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (concluding that all laws that classiﬁed on the basis of race—even those that sought to integrate institutions and remedy past
harms—were subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976).
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or tobacco);90 and expansions in protections for commercial speech (for instance, to encompass the sale of doctors’ prescription records).91 Each of these
developments was marked by the Court’s revision of what democracy required.
In the area of commercial speech, for example, the Court shifted over time from
a conception that gave no protection at all to commercial speech to one that provided expansive protection—protection the Court considered necessary, citing
the importance of information for consumers and efficient markets, and the
specter of legislatures harboring animus and bent on discriminating against corporations themselves.92
At a certain level of abstraction, this development seems in tension with the
previous two, as it involves increased constitutional concern with economic ordering, where the ﬁrst and second developments mainly insist on a sharp distinction between state and economy. As we see it, however, the real importance
of these cases is that they fortify the line between the political and the economic
by shielding economic power from political disruption, even when the invalidated
political action is aimed at achieving a value basic to democracy, such as the
equalizing of inﬂuence in elections.93 As some of us have argued elsewhere, to
understand a pattern of jurisprudence such as the Twentieth-Century Synthesis,
one must appreciate that more than one style of reasoning may contribute to the
same result. Courts “roll back” review on some fronts and “roll out” review on
others, but in both cases they tend to protect private power from state interference, whether that interference takes the form of judicial review or legislative
action.94 Moreover, in keeping with the law-and-political-economy premise that
state action and economic power are always mutually intertwined, it is key to
appreciate that the result of these decisions is not to segregate state power from
economic power but to exacerbate an increasingly oligarchic political economy

90.
91.
92.

93.

94.

See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. F. (2018) [hereinafter Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment]; Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014); Amy Kapczynski, Free Speech, Inc., BOS.
REV., Summer 2019.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (per curiam) (“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”).
Grewal & Purdy, supra note 21, at 1, 14.
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in which private power is readily translated into inﬂuence over public decisions.95
The third deﬁning move was a growing public-law skepticism toward political judgments about distribution and economic ordering, based on the conviction that these judgments are likely to enforce and entrench the kinds of “capture” that James Buchanan’s “political economy” emphasized.96 These concerns
recur in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, in which the Justices suggest that legislatures setting ground rules for campaign ﬁnance must be illegitimately seeking to skew future elections97 or when they suggest that legislatures
applying speciﬁc rules to corporate conduct in markets must be “discriminating”
against business.98 It also infuses the Court’s recent First Amendment opinions
cutting back dues-based funding for public-sector unions, which treat those unions as signal cases of self-entrenching interest groups likely to distort public
policy.99 These latter strands of law-and-economic thinking have also had substantial inﬂuence on other ﬁelds of law.100 The public-choice literature on rent
seeking, which models the state as a platform for interest-group competition,
deeply reshaped many ﬁelds where scholars had previously reasoned about public purposes and participation.101 “Interest-group capture” became an axiomatic
problem of the regulatory state, leading inﬂuential academics to argue that the
only appropriate response was a move to market-mediated technocracy, in the

95.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

101.

See infra note 170; see also Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian
First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1953 (2018) (asking if the First Amendment has
“egalitarian elements that could be recovered”).
Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrenchment,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2172-75 (2018).
Id. at 2165.
Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment, supra note 92.
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Purdy,
supra note 96.
Foundational law-and-economic pieces here include 3 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43-62 (1965); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
(1975); and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3 (1971).
K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 40-43 & nn.54-71 (2017). See generally
S.M. AMADAE, RATIONALIZING CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY: THE COLD WAR ORIGINS OF RATIONAL CHOICE LIBERALISM (2003); DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011) (describing
a broad intellectual shift away from public, collective purpose to emphasis of individual choice
across a range of intellectual disciplines and public debates). Administrative law and civil procedure are two examples of ﬁelds affected.
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form of cost-beneﬁt analysis.102 The administrative state was remade along the
way, with cost-beneﬁt analysis used to block any regulation that did not meet a
market-denominated test of value from the Reagan Administration onward.103
A new generation of scholarship seeking to inﬂuence the application of cost-beneﬁt analysis followed, creating a new center of gravity in ﬁelds from environmental law to workplace regulation.104 More broadly, scholars from across the
political spectrum deployed market-making techniques to resolve canonically
public-law problems, such as those of environmental protection.
By the 1980s and 1990s, legal scholars were facing courts (and agencies and
political parties, though we cannot elaborate the point here) increasingly insensible to dynamics of structural exclusion, and increasingly unwilling to
acknowledge the interaction between market relations and citizenship. The legal
academy shifted in response, and debates in mainstream legal scholarship migrated to make questions of political economy hard to ask because they were
seemingly already settled both theoretically and practically. The end result was a
legal-academic discourse that rendered matters of structural subordination increasingly identiﬁed as issues of “identity” and institutions that once were robust
realms of debate about the institutionalization of democratic voice increasingly
subject to expert-denominated claims of efficiency.
Many legal scholars objected to this turn, generating a rich literature on
structural discrimination and subordination, and criticizing the elevation of
market functions to principles of government. For example, many scholars of
constitutional law and antidiscrimination continued to insist on the importance
of the economic dimensions of political membership, equality, and liberty, and
mapped these questions as centrally related to issues of race and gender.105 The

102.

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Beneﬁt State 4 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 39, 1996) (defending cost-beneﬁt analysis as “as a way of diminishing interestgroup pressures on regulation”).
103. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz,
Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2011) (recounting the entrenchment of cost-beneﬁt analysis through subsequent administrations).
104. See, e.g., KYSAR, supra note 47 (offering critiques of cost-beneﬁt analysis in environmental
law).
105. See, e.g., SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT (2014) (describing the history of efforts to enshrine constitutional rights in the workplace); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 (2016) (describing the history and development of New Deal welfare programs); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 669 (2014) (arguing that antioligarchy and a robust middle class are constitutional principles); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (arguing that
U.S. law created a kind of property interest in racial identity).
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move to recenter questions of political economy in law is in many ways the outgrowth and elaboration of such efforts.
D. The Putative Liberal Appeal of the Synthesis
The Twentieth-Century Synthesis defended market freedom on several interlocking grounds. It represented the market as a domain of uncoerced individual consent by effacing the power relations operating through and behind the
market. By the same token, the Synthesis framed the market as an aggregative
instrument through which to assess and achieve the social good. The market activity that reﬂected uncoerced individual voluntarism also delivered “efficient”
outcomes that maximized social value, barring circumstances that could be described as a market “failure” (that is, the failure of actually existing markets to
behave as the normative instruments they were supposed to be). Thus, both theoretical problems concerning distributive justice and practical problems concerning the assessment and fulﬁllment of needs could be set aside so long as the
market system delivered (or seemed to deliver) at least rough approximations of
distributive justice.
The market’s neutrality with respect to any particular version of the social
good was central to this account’s appeal. While law-and-economics scholars did
not tend to claim neutrality explicitly for their normative position, instead defending wealth or various forms of efficiency as good social ends, the law-andeconomics focus on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (wealth maximization) nonetheless
evoked an ideal of neutrality. Appeals to aggregate efficiency promise to avoid
controversial political and ethical judgments. In the case of Kaldor-Hicks, they
do so by relying on criteria that theoretically could make everyone better off. The
implicit vision is of a neutral constitutional order encasing a market system that
enables the realization of many different conceptions of the good in a liberalpluralist frame.106 The affirmative idea that a market order secures an important
form of the liberal value of neutrality interacts here with the negative idea that
any political judgments about which social interests to secure or advance are
likely to involve capture, entrenchment, and spurious claims to a (probably nonexistent) “public interest,” giving examples of what we earlier called marketfundamentalist and market-tragedy arguments. As we have argued above and
elsewhere, this version of neutrality conceals and enforces signiﬁcant judgments

106.

See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
(1990); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1973).
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about who gets what (distribution) and who gets to do what to whom (coercion).107
The conceit that market order could provide sufficiently fair and acceptable
outcomes more closely resembled the political-economic reality of the immediate
postwar period than it would that of the following decades. During the period
of relatively high and widely shared growth that followed World War II, when
formal barriers to equal market participation were being dismantled, many
hoped that market outcomes would roughly correspond to those demanded by
various accounts of distributive justice. The markets might render the poor as
well off as they could be (as formalized in Rawlsian justice theory) and enable
us to overcome racial and gender subordination through formal equalization of
economic opportunity.108 Moreover, rising working-class incomes suggested the
promise of yet more needs fulﬁllment over time, all without having to resort to
politically contentious policies of redistribution or direct-needs provisioning by
the state. Implementing such policies would have required wrestling with complex and unresolved questions of distributive justice. This also would have raised
practical problems attending the political management of the economy, including the reshaping of foundational market processes (that is, the curtailment of
“market freedom”), all in a social world beset by conﬂicts over race and gender
that made any kind of redistributive politics extremely contentious.
The use of the market to avoid such theoretical and practical difficulties was
not new to the postwar period, though it arguably worked better for those decades than at any point earlier or afterward. It reﬂected a long-running intellectual effort to champion the market as the appropriate instrument of social choice
in modern, pluralist societies. Market activity, on this account, both respects individual will and discloses information about individual preferences, while ostensibly remaining neutral with respect to controversial arguments about the social good. This characterization of the market as uniquely respectful of
individuality and diversity helped to advance it as the key institution of liberal
social order.
So depicted, the market proves a unique site in which to determine and
achieve social good in liberal societies: the consenting individual is the author of

107.

See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 993-1006 (2012); Purdy, supra note 96.
108. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 1, at 66-67 (discussing Rawls’s political theory and the elite assumption that incorporation into the market would overcome status subordination). On postwar political liberalism and its assumptions, see generally KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE
SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR LIBERALISM AND THE REMAKING OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(2019). See also David Singh Grewal, Closing Remarks: Law and Inequality After the Crisis, 35
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337 (2016) (discussing the ways that the postwar exception was described in the countries that experienced it).
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the norms under which she will live, disciplined only by the general expectation
that the others with whom she cooperates must also be treated as such normative
agents. Inclusion in the market’s private ordering thus became a central aim of
many accounts of individual rights and their purposes, including the rights of
individuals subordinated in racialized and gendered hierarchies. Arguments
about market freedom thus paralleled liberal arguments about self-realization,
even while promising more than liberal accommodation alone. The market
would deliver more of what everyone wanted without requiring anyone to consent to a comprehensive account of the social good. This view imagined the economy as what society was embedded in, rather than the other way around. But in
fact a market embedded in society with continued group stratiﬁcation and persistent wealth gaps could not yield freedom for all, any more than it could provide returns equal to individuals’ marginal product.
E. The Fragile Success of the Synthesis in Historical and Political Context
Although we have highlighted the development of ideas, we mean to locate
this disciplinary history in a larger account that is itself alert to political economy.
In some respects, the development of methods is relatively autonomous, and so
we can recount the “internal” reasons for the plausibility of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. In other respects, the success of these methods, and especially
their rise to institutional dominance, depended on “external” drivers in their historical moment. The institutional origins of law and economics, as Steven Teles
has shown, lie in a rebellion against the New Deal that brought a small group of
economists into the University of Chicago Law School, supported by Friedrich
von Hayek and the Volker Fund.109 Judicial appointments mattered, too: validation in the courts is important to legal scholars’ proﬁles and to the genre of legal
scholarship that seeks to inﬂuence the interpretation of the law and the development of doctrine.

109.

As Steven Teles describes, the “organizational history of law and economics, like so much of
the modern conservative movement, begins with the University of Chicago.” STEVEN M.
TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE
LAW 91 (2008). It was Henry Simons, an economics professor who moved into the law school
in the 1930s and who had helped to publish Friedrich von Hayek’s inﬂuential Road to Serfdom
in the United States, who created the institutional preconditions of the movement. Id. With
the support of Hayek and the Volker Fund, Simons brought Aaron Director to the law school,
who would teach, found the Journal of Law and Economics, and, as Ronald Coase memorably
put it, serve as the “Christ” to Coase’s “St. Paul”: “[Director] got the doctrine going, and what
I had to do was bring it to the gentiles.” Id. at 96.
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It is unlikely, though, that all of these rationalizations of market relations
would have gained the same traction absent unique historical conditions. Without being reductionist, we can recognize law and economics as both autonomous
scholarship and as a partial rationalization that gained support within a speciﬁc
political economy. For example, compared to the conﬂict-ridden and highly unequal decades that produced the work of Robert Hale and other legal realists, the
years from the mid-1950s through the early 1970s were marked by several salient
characteristics. In economics, it was a time of signiﬁcant growth that was widely
distributed among households.110 In policy, despite considerable ideological
contestation from a right wing that had never accepted the New Deal, there was
unusual détente among professional and governmental elites, who broadly presupposed the necessity and persistence of a strong regulatory and redistributive
state.111 The Cold War helped foster a rare degree of cohesion among elites, who
projected the view that American institutions were fundamentally sound and
that problems like racial hierarchy could be addressed with simple acts of liberal
integration.112 A quasicorporatist state-and-party system seemed to uphold the
redistributive and regulatory consensus.113 The system and consensus were underpinned by unions, which represented a substantial share of private-sector
workers and played a central role in the Democratic Party, which controlled Congress for most of these decades.114
Under the supposition that these conditions represented a “new normal,”
when law and economics came to prominence in the late 1970s and 1980s, many
centrist and liberal scholars and policy elites likely found some plausibility in its
assumptions, even if they were not themselves its vanguard. Wealth maximization may have seemed a plausibly desirable goal of economic policy because, in
fact, new income seemed to be widely shared. Where distribution fell short, the
Kaldor-Hicks formula of redistributing through the tax code to compensate losers, while of course never approaching its Paretian utopia, was a plausible rough
description of how the redistributive state might operate. Even more basically,
many assumed that the problems of democratic capitalism had basically been
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111.
112.
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See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 14-15; Grewal, supra note 1, at 630-31; Grewal & Purdy, supra note
1, at 64-70.
See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 1, at 64-65.
See Aziz Rana, Goodbye Cold War, N+1 (Winter 2018), https://nplusonemag.com/issue-30
/politics/goodbye-cold-war [https://perma.cc/85YV-CSE5] (“[T]he new assumption of the
cold-war order was that American institutions were essentially just, and the only necessary
change would be to open these institutions to worthy members of black and brown communities.”).
See JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION: THE NEW DEAL AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICS
(2016) (sketching the institutional terms of this era).
See id.
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solved through the application of Keynesian macroeconomic policies to tame the
business cycle. On this view, law now required mainly tinkering and maintenance, casting legal scholars—not only in ﬁelds like antitrust but also critically
in domains such as environmental law, administrative law, and the like—as a
band of methodologically equipped efficiency inspectors. They could conﬁrm
that core doctrines and institutions were sound, while sending up reports proposing incremental adjustments. The importance of democratic justiﬁcation for
economic ordering receded as actual conﬂict over the economic order quieted
(though more in the experience and self-understanding of elites than in fact).
Instead, a relatively uniﬁed, technocratic mission coalesced that coincided neatly
with the linking theories: facilitate transactions, internalize externalities, and
maximize economic activity. The tasks that law and economics set for itself were
legal scholarship’s version of the ABCs for the period’s mainstream, technocratic
agenda.
The popularity of law and economics and of a certain form of revived left
liberalism should also be understood in the context of the conﬂicts of mid-century political economy. The civil-rights movement’s goals included not just the
end of formal segregation in the Jim Crow South but also stronger forms of reparation. For example, black-freedom advocates sought massive redistributive investment in black communities and intervention in the “private” and “voluntary” spheres.115 They pointed to residential and employment patterns, which
had laundered centuries of racialized inequality, explicit segregation, and outright violence.116 It was in the face of these demands for a more material conception of equality that constitutional equality was decisively dematerialized. A denuded conception of equality moved off the state’s balance sheet both historical
maldistribution of wealth and new forms of segregation such as “white ﬂight”
into de facto segregated schools. In other words, as old inequalities came under
new pressure and new, market-facilitated inequalities arose, constitutional
equality concerns were quietly withdrawn from the ﬁeld.
The early 1970s saw a new political assertion of business-led hostility toward
the regulatory and redistributive state.117 The hostility was bolstered by anxiety
about the “new social movements” such as feminism and environmentalism, a
growing popular radicalism in political ideas and rhetoric, and spiraling cycles
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See Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, COMMENT.,
Feb. 1965.
116. See Nathan Hare, Black Ecology, 1 BLACK SCHOLAR 2 (1970); Rustin, supra note 115.
117. See KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW
DEAL (2010) (tracing the twentieth-century history of antiregulatory politics).
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of wage demands and inﬂation.118 These forces together formed a transatlantic
“legitimation crisis” that called into question postwar Keynesian liberalism.119
These forms of anti-Keynesianism ran together in the beginning of American
neoliberalism, as the reassertion of an aggressive and expansive program of market-modeled law reform that cut back the New Deal and Great Society state and
launched new frontiers in marketization.120 The extension of neoclassical analysis from the law of the economy to the theory of the state thus helped to produce
another, overlapping constituency: the anti-Keynesians who saw public-law
concern with distribution and power as a dangerous folly best replaced with
market-modeled versions of formal liberty and equality.121
It is against this broader backdrop that the Twentieth-Century Synthesis
took hold. But the context is changing for reasons both internal to legal scholarship and connected to the troubled combination of crisis and stasis that mark
our era. We argue that these reasons demand a new set of critical questions and
orientations in legal scholarship.
ii. critical questions and reorientations
What might legal scholarship that took the political nature of the economy
seriously look like? What questions would it foreground, and how would it address them? We offer a possible set of broad reorientations and questions, intended not as a last word but as invitation. They are constructed from our critique of the deﬁciencies of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis and in dialogue
with developments across legal scholarship and grassroots movements.
A. From Efficiency to Power
By centering efficiency as a value and making key assumptions about markets
and how they work, the Twentieth-Century Synthesis marginalized questions of
power that had been central to legal analysis since at least the time of legal realism. Realists understood that the law generates the very order of rights that market advocates invoke to deﬁne the boundaries of “the economy.” As they pointed
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See JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973) (giving an early theorization of the new
social movements).
119. See id. (laying out an account of the structural conditions in which a capitalist social order
could not maintain its stability and legitimacy).
120. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 1, at 77-80.
121. See RAHMAN, supra note 101, at 31-53 (analyzing how this anti-Keynesian assault was absorbed
and mainstreamed by the technocratic and managerial liberalism of the 1990s and 2000s).
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out, when the state orders “private” rights it acts coercively, but in indirect fashion, allocating powers and immunities that authorize individuals to act on or
with disregard for others.
Take as an example the thought of legal realist and institutional economist
Robert Hale. Hale characterized economic life as a system of mutual coercion,
with the degree of each person’s coercive power arising directly from legal entitlements. “The law,” Hale stressed, “confers on each person a wholly unique set
of liberties with regard to the use of material goods and imposed on each person
a unique set of restrictions with regard thereto.”122 Law, that is, allocates the
powers and resources that are necessary to most human projects, thus deﬁning
the terrain on which people must work with others to fulﬁll their needs and pursue their purposes. Property law, for instance, tells you whom you must induce
to give you access to what you need to meet your needs; conversely, it says which
resources others can only access by winning your permission. This power to
drive a (more or less hard) bargain was what Hale called coercion, and he saw it
everywhere. For him, every bargain was conducted in the spirit of the strike and
the lockout. (It is no coincidence that his was a theory of economic life for a time
of ﬁerce labor conﬂict.)
This account centers the power, rooted in state decisions and articulated
through law, that constitutes the ﬁeld of economic life. The Twentieth-Century
Synthesis held that such power was unimportant, either by redirecting attention
from it or by denying that power was stratiﬁed or structured in ways that matter.
By refocusing scholarship on questions structured by transaction costs and externalities, law-and-economics analysis placed questions of distribution and coercion outside the lamplight of methodology. It thus neglected the actual social
world comprised of highly disparate resource allocations that are themselves
products of background legal rules: the power of the venture capitalist to bring
to life or quash the plans of others; the trust beneﬁciary’s option to refuse unwelcome offers in favor of idleness; and the acute need of the person living without any savings (as forty percent of Americans do) to ﬁnd and accept an unequal
bargain in order to stay alive.123 As important were a host of assumptions about
markets and market subjects. Markets were typically presumed to be sufficiently
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ROBERT HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 15
(1952).
123. See Jeff Larrimore et al., Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017, BOARD
GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. 21 (May 2018) (noting that four in ten adults would need to sell
property, borrow money, or not be able to pay at all if confronted with a four hundred dollar
expense),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/ﬁles/2017-report-economic-well
-being-us-households-201805.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4EZ-3QD2].
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competitive that concentrated power generally could not last.124 Some suggested
that politics might “clear” as markets did, so that when wealth was reallocated,
when, for example, a new legal rule took from one side and gave to the other, it
would be transferred back via a seamlessly adjusting market of politics.125
Under the pressure of these various conceptual moves, legal thought was effectively disabled from centering questions about power and distribution that
would once obviously have been its main concerns. Who gives the orders, who
dictates the plans, and who must aim to win a place as a cog in someone else’s
scheme? Who takes proﬁts, who takes wages, and whose wages make for a secure life versus a precarious one? When the questions are posed in this way, it
becomes clear that in the economists’ standard deﬁnition of their subject matter,
“choice under constraint,” the emphasis should fall soundly on “constraint” and
its legally constituted allocation. The study of that constraint, what Hale called
the ubiquitous mutual coercion of economic relations on the basis of (almost
always unequal) bargaining power, is the question that should replace the focus
on the feasibility and comprehensiveness of bargains and the sum of economic
activity that they make up.
What would it mean to take power once more as a central unit of analysis in
law? In the broadest sense, when we teach a canonical case or encounter a legal
problem, we might ask quite simply, who has power here, who should have
power, and why? At least three forms of power deserve our attention: the constitutive power of law to create endowments that shape all voluntary bargains, the
market power that legal structures enable, and the political power that may arise
from differential endowments, market power, or ways that legal rules insulate
economic power from democratic reordering. In selecting topics and framing
questions, this reorientation would inquire into how law creates, reproduces, and
protects political-economic power, for whom, and with what results.
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See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957) (suggesting that market
forces would end discrimination in labor markets); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928-34 (1979) (noting that in the Chicago School,
not only could ﬁrms not unilaterally “obtain or enhance monopoly power” but that problems
of collusion were unlikely to be serious because, for example, cartels were unstable and barriers to entry could be presumed low enough to attract entrants to any supracompetitive market).
125. But see Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Impacts from School
Finance Litigation, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4 (2018) (critiquing the point and providing
empirical evidence against it); see also William A. Darity Jr. et al., Stratiﬁcation Economics: A
General Theory of Intergroup Inequality, in THE HIDDEN RULES OF RACE: BARRIERS TO AN INCLUSIVE ECONOMY 35, 43 (Andrea Flynn et al. eds., 2017) (offering criticisms, within a neoclassical framework, of notions of unbiased preferences for redistribution, given racial stratiﬁcation in the United States).
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Regarding constitutive power, an LPE reorientation would mean less attention to Coasean problems and what we might call (following the lead of economic sociologists) the “social geometry of bargains.”126 Whom does law endow
with bargaining power, and with what justiﬁcation? How, if we aspired to more
egalitarian distribution of power and resources, might law reconﬁgure these endowments—through both redistribution and “predistribution”? This way of
reasoning would also invite attention to the history of state creation of systemically unequal endowments and to how legal regimes and lawyers by coding resources as capital have contributed to stratiﬁcation and patterned disadvantage.127 For example, we might, as some scholars of law and political
economy already have, map the relations between techniques to render land a
source of credit and the historical dispossession of native lands,128 or rules of
ﬁnance, property, and inheritance that have systematically undermined both
black wealth and black land ownership in recent years.129 Insofar as property and
contract law serve as ﬁrst-year allegories for economic life in general, our reorientation would also—in conjunction with attention to market and political
power—redirect the pedagogical spirit of “private law” courses toward examining inequality and encasement of private power in markets as an ongoing product of law. The same reorientation would mean asking in other “economic”
courses how law patterns the landscape of bargaining power: how antitrust law,
for instance, has produced—but might instead restrict—new forms of enhanced
bargaining power for ﬁrms, or how shifts in labor law have reduced labor’s endowments but correspondingly might be revised to generate more meaningful
countervailing power and negotiation over workplace governance.130
Market power, too, requires attention from a political-economy perspective.
Economic power cannot be reduced to market power, as our discussions of constitutive and political power indicate. But in the presence of market power—the
ability to dictate prices and the terms of market transactions due to one’s dominant position as a buyer or seller—allocating decisions to markets will generate
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See, e.g., Georg Simmel, The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the
Group, 8 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1902).
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(2016).
See BARADARAN, supra note 14.
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signiﬁcant problems both within a conventional economic framework and beyond it. For example, where employers have pervasive monopsony power, we
can expect implications for wages and working conditions that lend credence to
new arguments for antitrust intervention, employment regulation, and the afﬁrmative support of labor as countervailing power.131 Notably, a new wave of
scholarship in economics argues that market power is today a pervasive rather
than occasional phenomenon.132
Finally, to do justice to the conjunction that is political economy, we must also
ask when and how economic power relates to political power. Political-science
literature has begun to document the inﬂuence of wealth on legislation.133 We
should ask about the means by which economic power translates into political
power and how law structures, or could restructure, these channels of inﬂuence.134 Of special importance here are measures that encase market power from
politics, disabling ordinary democratic means of deﬁning the place of markets in
our political order. For example, investigations of where and how property or
markets receive constitutional protection, as well as the limits of such regimes
and their potential for reinterpretation, deserve to be central subjects of political
economy.135
131.
132.
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Important examples of the former include takings law, constitutional caps on punitive damages, and the constitutionalization of campaign ﬁnance. For examples of academic work to
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In a broader frame, the move to political economy requires a shift in our view
of interpersonal relations—not as presumptively equal market transactions that
are further legitimated by being voluntary and theoretically “making everyone
better off” but rather as fundamentally power-laden bargains that require law
and policy to be rendered more equal and fair. It also requires a shift in our view
of inclusion from the individual to the structural level, looking not just at individualized experience but rather at how law and policy construct systematic
forms of hierarchy and domination through a market that is always embedded
in social relations. This is one of the key insights of critical legal thought and
literature from both feminists and scholars of critical race theory.136
Then, we may ask: how might public power be reconstituted where the market has been insulated from democratic control? Which legal tools are required?
What is the proper relationship between expertise and democratic authority, and
how can that be institutionalized? How might one reenvision the process of democratizing control over the economy, while recognizing the harms that governments have done—always to some more than others—in the name of the people?
B. From Neutrality to Equality
A claim of neutrality was at the center of the synthesis that sutured together
efficiency claims that came to dominate “economic” law and the thin form of
liberalism that made way for the entrenchment of private power on the “public”
side. But market ordering is only neutral if one takes power off the table and
assumes a self-valorizing perspective on market transactions. Neutrality is a valid
goal for the law in certain circumstances (such as fact ﬁnding in criminal prosecutions) but neutrality as an ultimate end fails on various grounds.137 Through
rediscover public authority over market conditions, see Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription
for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH.
275 (2016); and Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal
Approach to Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791 (2016).
136. See, e.g., DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE
ADVANTAGE 4-5 (2014) (describing how dynamics can “lock-in” privilege over time, even assuming only unequal starting points and not the continuation of malicious intent to discriminate); John B. Davis, Stratiﬁcation Economics as an Economics of Exclusion, 2 J. ECON. RACE &
POL’Y 163, 164 (2019) (describing the new ﬁeld of “stratiﬁcation economics” that assumes that
“the economy is embedded in society and social relationships explain market relationships, so
that the laws or dynamics of society explain how the economy works, not that society is explained by how the economy works”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (providing an intersectional analysis of law’s relation to
race and gender).
137. See, for example, MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998);
and CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989),
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its elevation of wealth as an orienting public value, it has reinforced a very nonneutral drift toward elite control of government, increasingly described by political scientists as “oligarchy.”138
Which alternatives might supplant this dubious neutrality ideal, with its oligarchic drift? We suggest orienting law and policy analysis around an ideal of
equality—particularly a vision of equality animated by a commitment to self-rule
and sensitive to the importance of social subordination along intersectional lines.
Moving from neutrality to equality requires the difficult and overdue work of
assessing the appropriate scope and limits of private ordering—and the role for
market transaction in particular—in light of a political ideal of citizen self-rule.
This is not a new claim. As the Twentieth-Century Synthesis was consolidated
into neoliberalism, there was an outpouring of interest from legal scholars and
others concerning the appropriate scope and limits of private ordering in light
of a variety of theories of distributive justice, many with an explicitly egalitarian
dimension.139 As these decades of reﬂection on egalitarianism have shown, rejecting welfarism leads quickly to the question: equality of what?140 A call for
equality must suggest how that equality is to be conceptualized and institutionally realized.
Nonetheless, we can sketch a broad direction in which normative critique can
proceed. We do so on three fronts, each developing longstanding arguments
running back to the Realist and Progressive Eras.141 The ﬁrst approach would be
to develop a normative theory of bargaining that centers a substantive ideal of
freedom, rather than relying upon the formal idea of uncoerced agreement. One
might distinguish, for instance, among three registers in which people can seek
to win the assent of others: (1) by threatening violence (the archetypal relationship of war or enslavement, which liberal political economy foundationally rejects); (2) by threatening to withhold economic opportunity, even down to bare
necessities (the basic character of much market bargaining); and (3) by offering
cooperation that enables others to achieve vocation or ﬂourishing.142 The law
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constitutes bargaining situations that sort participants among these three registers—nominally prohibiting the ﬁrst and setting up the third as the ideal, but
with most bargaining actually falling in the second category—inﬂected in important ways by race and gender.
To the extent that basic needs are guaranteed, whether through direct provision, robust income support, or egalitarian wealth distribution, people move
along the spectrum from appeals to economic necessity toward appeals to ﬂourishing or vocation. Similarly, decarceral projects, as well as projects that make
the state’s commitment to stopping private violence more real for women, people of color, LGBT individuals, and people with disabilities, would be central to
realizing a world of genuinely free social cooperation. This version of economic
freedom would support diverse ways of life, and so be neutral in that sense, while
at the same time being decidedly non-neutral as to the distribution of power in
bargaining that determines whose dreams come true. In these respects, to demand more substantive equality is to express genuine respect for the individuality and diversity that Hayek and other neoliberals attributed to the laissez-faire
marketplace but which the actual marketplace undermines. Hazards such as
hunger, loss of shelter, loss of dignity, the safety or basic opportunities of one’s
children, and the dignity of the disabled should be taken off the table in individual bargaining as already socially resolved. To say this is to insist that there are
aspects of what we owe one another that must be fulﬁlled if we are able to live in
equality together.
A second and related approach that reorients law to equality moves from the
setting of interpersonal bargaining to structural questions. How does law pattern power and vulnerability, not simply at the level of individuals (asking what
rights and entitlements someone can claim) or through its shaping of the scope
of interpersonal cooperation (bargaining), but with reference to the intersection
between these legally constituted distributions and the other ways in which people are already differentiated socially and legally? One of the most formative accounts of legal modernity describes it as a move from the age of “status” to “contract.”143 But old forms of racial and gender hierarchy persist, alongside sexual
hierarchies and hierarchies of ability and disability. An approach that puts inequality at its center would need to ask how “status”—meaning the differentiation
of citizens according to categories—persists and is reproduced in the age of contract. How might law operating in a highly unequal political economy recreate
an ordering according to status, now produced by or at least laundered through
contract? The fact that, descriptively and historically, such hierarchies persist
143.
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suggests that they are more important to the construction of liberal market society than is generally appreciated.
Relatedly, one might assume that particular patterns of class interest arise in
contemporary market economies and ask how the legal regime preserves the interests of employers and owners of capital or those of working people and the
economically marginalized. For instance, two of us have characterized neoliberalism in part by reference to its use of the law to serve the imperatives of proﬁt,
capital mobility, and “freedom to manage” over competing, democratically articulated distributional priorities.144 One of us has suggested that, in certain areas
in which First Amendment jurisprudence has come to bear on economic ordering, the spurious version of state “neutrality” secured under free-speech principles should be replaced by substantive political judgments about the allocations
of power that a democracy should make between its owning and laboring classes.145 Any version of this approach would borrow from an empirical and theoretical account of some of the salient divisions in social life to create a rough matrix on which to consider the distributional consequences of law.
Finally, regrounding law and policy analysis in a broad conception of equality will require scholars to articulate substantive notions of what a commitment
to equality should mean in different domains of law (just as legal scholars have
done using the broad ideal of neutrality). This means reengaging with lines of
argument developed in law and neighboring disciplines during the early decades
of neoliberal consolidation.146 The common aim to destabilize welfarism and its
questionable metaethical underpinnings reﬂected a welter of perspectives ranging from liberal theorists concerned with the autonomy-degrading aspects of
welfarism to Marxian-inspired accounts of need.147
These debates must be reengaged—and reengaged by scholars working in
the many “private law” ﬁelds to which they were thought somehow not to apply.
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A concrete focus on what kinds of equality we want law to generate directs attention to questions such as: what do people need to achieve certain kinds of life,
and what does it take to get those goods to them? Besides distribution, issues of
public provision become essential concerns here, from health care to transport
infrastructure. No such shift, however, will be complete without a political conception of the capable agent, and it is in the turn from antipolitics to democracy
that any such normative reorientation ﬁnds its ultimate stakes.
C. From Antipolitics to Democracy
Our basic commitment is to democracy. By that we do not (yet) mean to take
a position in the ﬁerce and multifarious debates over which set of political procedures and institutions counts as democratic or which is “most” democratic. We
mean something simpler: law’s creation of economic order should be accountable to those who live in that order, and the ultimate standard of accountability is
the democratic will of the people, expressed in procedures that accord equal
weight to all members in structuring our shared life. The versions of legal neutrality that we have been criticizing—wealth maximization and other forms of
efficiency analysis in “economic” law and formal (structurally indifferent) equality and liberty in “public” law—erect barriers to political judgments about economic order. These antipolitical consequences are not accidental—they are
rooted in the contexts in which these theories came to prominence and the goals
and fears of those who advanced them. Indeed, part of the allure of discourses of
efficiency and neutrality lies precisely in the claim that these discourses—and the
system of market governance itself—can produce optimal outcomes without the
messiness of politics and, ultimately, the acknowledgement that political conﬂict
is resolved in an exercise of public power in which some win and some lose. Because distribution and coercion are central to economic life, political judgments
that legally constitute and shape the economy cannot avoid this hard consequence. The antipolitics of spurious neutrality serves to make it seem inevitable,
and to preserve its results from democratic contest and control. Breaking down
the Twentieth-Century Synthesis’s artiﬁcial barriers between political and economic ordering means embracing the need for political judgments about the
gravest questions: who should exercise power, of what sort, and over whom?
What should count as a human need, and what claims should politically recognized needs give us against the state and thus against one another? Whose
dreams come true, and who is enlisted in the realization of others’ schemes?
The antipolitics of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis reshaped the practice of
governing itself. At various moments of social transformation, radical reformers—from the rise of the labor and antitrust movements in the late nineteenth
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century to the civil-rights movement of the 1960s—imagined a radically democratized state reﬂective of and responsive to affected communities themselves.148
But in the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, governance—even in its more progressive, reform-oriented aspects—came to be viewed as an antipolitical operation.
As discussed earlier, this shift emerged in part from the neoliberal critique of the
state itself, led by “public-choice theory” thinkers like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, which portrayed government as inherently prone to capture and
corruption. These arguments gained political favor as business interests and critics of civil-rights reforms, among others, advanced them as part of a decadeslong attack on the New Deal and civil-rights state.149 In response to this onslaught, many policymakers, including liberals as well as conservatives, pursued
an agenda of deregulation. What remained of the state was chastened, as policymakers took refuge in a model of technocracy with two touchstones: ﬁrst, the
importance of apolitical “good governance” that emphasizes transparency, costbeneﬁt analysis, and expertise;150 and second, the preferred technique of using
government to better optimize markets themselves, such as through “nudge”style regulations151 or measures to improve market efficiency.152 But this approach meant that governance was minimalist—silent on the deeper, background disparities of power and in retreat from transformative structural reform.
It also implied a turn toward a more individualistic picture of democratic participation and authority and a turn away from a vision of democracy as a process of
building collective power. Lost along the way was a commitment to institutions
like unions that once were understood as important vehicles for “countervailing
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power.” Lost too were visions of politics that saw it as a domain where transformative moral claims could be forged.
What would it mean to reorient legal institutions and thought toward an
explicit pursuit of democracy, with an emphasis on rebuilding a democratic
power signiﬁcant and durable enough to overcome the contemporary crises?
While a comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this Feature, we can identify a number of critical questions and already-emerging frontiers of debate
where scholars, activists, and policymakers alike are returning their attention to
questions of power, equality, and speciﬁcally a revival of democratic politics.
First, a shift from the antipolitics of markets and technocrats to a deeply inclusive and empowering democracy requires strengthening existing institutions
of electoral democracy. This requires renewed commitment to voting rights,
overcoming gerrymandering, defending campaign-ﬁnance laws, and ultimately
challenging the antimajoritarian features of the American constitutional scheme,
notably the Electoral College and the Senate. More fundamentally, however, it
requires a direct challenge to the ways that antipolitics constrains even the most
seamlessly majoritarian of politics. Although courts play an important role in a
system of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court, by inserting its highly formal and ideologically charged doctrines of neutrality into campaign ﬁnance and
economic governance,153 has earned the charge of “juristocracy.”154 For many
decades, the default tendency of public-law scholars has been to ask what the
courts, as a matter of principle, should do. Taking democratic action more seriously than this court-centric view would reorient legal scholarship to less familiar ﬁelds of institutional reform and democratic action.155
Second, a commitment to building democratic politics requires attention to
deeper infrastructures of political power and the ways political power can be
hoarded or neutered. For example, recent First Amendment scholarship has increasingly identiﬁed how claims of free speech and association are deployed to

153.

See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
154. For a summary of the charge, see Samuel Moyn, Resisting the Juristocracy, BOSTON REV., Oct.
5, 2018. See also RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (providing the seminal analysis of the style of judicially constrained politics).
155. Consider, for example, the democratic potential of reforming antitrust law or ﬁnding new
forms of popular participation in the work of administrative agencies. Normatively, a place to
start is in defending what Jeremy Waldron terms the “dignity of legislation.” See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633 (1995).

1829

the yale law journal

129:1784

2020

accentuate the economic and political power of wealthy constituencies and corporations.156 At the same time, the associative rights of workers and grassroots
communities are under attack through both formal legal constraints and informal modes of intimidation and pressure.157 Even as public-law doctrine has
skewed political inﬂuence toward corporations and the wealthy, the “private”
economy has yielded a public sphere dominated by monopolies, from “old media” regional newspaper and television markets to Facebook, Twitter, and the
other dominant digital platforms.158 Ironically, these developments have produced both concentration of ultimate control and fragmentation of political argument into ideologically homogeneous segments, whether in a city with only
one newspaper or in the echo chambers of online argument. By contrast, a democratic political economy requires public investment and political regulation
aimed at supporting a media infrastructure that enables open and equal contestation.159 Just as important are durable civil-society institutions that enable nonelites to engage in mutual political education and to build power. Although
American civil society has often been imagined in contrast to law and politics,
labor unions have played a central role in the empowerment of ordinary people,
and their fragility and decline over the last ﬁfty years are thoroughly a function
of the structure and operation of the law.160 In keeping with our earlier call for a
patterned analysis of who beneﬁts and who loses from economy-structuring
lawmaking (as opposed to putatively neutral forms of aggregation), law should
shape the economy to support the institutions and capacities that uphold the
equality and efficacy of democratic citizens.161
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In synthesizing these last two points, we might say that two criteria deﬁne a
properly democratic political economy. First, the political community must be
able to assert its collective will over the economic order, not be blocked from
doing so by the antipolitics of efficiency-focused adjudication or technocracy.
Second, the substance of economic life must support democratic self-rule by ensuring substantial equality, freedom from abjection and dependence, a workplace experience of dignity and self-assertion rather than vulnerability and humiliation, and the capacity to build power through institutions such as unions.
A democratic political economy must be answerable to its citizens’ rule, and it
must produce citizens capable of ruling it.
Third, a commitment to democracy demands that we experiment with alternatives to the prevailing technologies of elite governance, particularly in the regulatory state itself. Instead of viewing state bureaucracy as a domain of apolitical
expertise (or of malevolent capture and corruption), we might reconceive regulatory bodies as sites of democratic contestation.162 If purportedly neutral and
technocratic visions for rationalizing governance are neither neutral nor, in practice, rationalizing, we need new conceptions of how to democratically discipline
administrative decisions. What would processes of administrative accountability
look like if they were wise to dynamics of power and animated by a commitment
to more genuine equality? There is a dynamic scholarly agenda here, already under construction. We might explore, for example, means to bring representatives
of affected communities to participate in administrative decision-making, aiming at modalities of democratic voice that could meet our needs for both (a
broadened conception) of expertise and for institutionalized forms of countervailing power.163 There is a rich history of social movements engaging and seeking to remake the regulatory state in a more inclusive, but still effective, way.164
A democratic political economy compels us to revisit and build on this tradition.
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Like many of the cases we have advanced here, the substance of these arguments lies in political morality. A democratic political economy is a moral project,
aimed at taking with full seriousness the equality of persons and our capacity to
set for ourselves the terms of our collective lives, to decide how to deal out power
and vulnerability, to ﬁgure out how to live together—and to defend these decisions to one another. When we follow Karl Polanyi in speaking of an economy
“embedded” in society,165 we mean not just that economic ordering is always
derived from legal ordering but also that an economy’s ordering of power and
vulnerability always bespeaks a moral vision of persons, whether egalitarian and
generous or hierarchical and cramped.
Thus, scholarship should consider what moral images of social and political
order are implied in a given legal patterning. What image of economic citizenship, or of a democratic economy, is embedded in a Brandeisian antitrust regime
or in a labor law that assumes workers are involved in governing the workplace?
In what ways is democracy or political membership hollowed out when replaced
by the increasingly libertarian and wealth-maximizing premises of the Synthesis? Do “private-law” regimes here constitute citizens as market subjects who
could demand a different kind of equality in these domains? What is revealed
about the racialization of political membership by racial patterns of property
ownership and loss, about gendered citizenship by the ways that the burdens of
social reproduction interact with the wage bargain?166 Once the legal constitution of the economy is taken to be centrally about the production and enforcement of inequality, these questions present themselves naturally.
conclusion
The Twentieth-Century Synthesis was a successful remaking of the legal imagination, creating a neoliberal political economy premised on concepts of efficiency, neutrality, and antipolitics. But even as this was a successful intellectual
shift, manifesting in a wide range of scholarly discourses, doctrinal areas, and
policy changes, it has always been a fragile conﬁguration. As the contradictions
of an increasingly unequal political economy have become painfully visible and
exacerbated, the veneer of consensus around this Synthesis has fallen away.
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Thus, we ﬁnd ourselves in a moment of political crisis and accompanying intellectual upheaval: an old order of political economy and its legitimating concepts
are crumbling, but a new order has yet to emerge. The outlines of the battle for
a new order have come into focus. The populisms of the far right, resurgent
across the globe, point to one dark path coming out of this moment: the resurgence of reactionary political economy that marries anger at economic and political corruption with exclusionary attachment to racialized and gendered hierarchy. At the same time, centrist calls for a restoration of an imagined pre-2016
consensus on norms of good governance ignore the deeper causes of neoliberalism’s crisis. But in contrast to both of these visions, the account offered here
points to the beginnings of a very different, more deeply democratic and progressive political economy.
To embrace the possibility of democratic renewal requires rejecting the terms
of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. We believe that the legal realists—and
thinkers in a much longer history of political thought—were right in believing
that “the economy” is neither self-deﬁning nor self-justifying. The emphasis in
these traditions has been the right one: on power, distribution, and the need for
legitimacy as the central themes in the organization of economic life. Moreover,
precisely because economic ordering is a political and legal artifact, the idea of
an “autonomous” economic domain has always been obscurantist and ideological, even when accepted in good faith.167
Law does not and never could simply defer to such a realm. Rather, law is
perennially involved in creating and enforcing the terms of economic ordering,
most particularly through the creation and maintenance of markets. One of its
most important roles, indeed, is determining who is subject to market ordering
and on what terms and who is exempted in favor of other kinds of protection or
provision.168 Thus the program of law, politics, and institution building often
called “neoliberalism” is, and can only be, a speciﬁc theory of how to use state
power, to what ends, and for whose beneﬁt.169 The ideological work of the
Twentieth-Century Synthesis has been to naturalize and embed in legal institutions from the Supreme Court to the Antitrust Office and World Trade Organization a speciﬁc disposition of power. This power represents a deployment of
market ordering that produces intense and cross-cutting forms of inequality and
democratic erosion. However, Twentieth-Century Synthesis theorists tend not
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to see this, precisely because the Synthesis makes it so hard to see (or at least so
easy to overlook).
If it is to succeed, law and political economy will also require something beyond mere critique. It will require a positive agenda. Many new and energized
voices, from the legal academy to political candidates to movement activists, are
already building in this direction,170 calling for and giving shape to programs for
more genuine democracy that also takes seriously questions of economic power
and racial subordination;171 more equal distribution of resources and life
chances;172 more public and shared resources and infrastructures;173 the displacement of concentrated corporate power and rooting of new forms of worker
power;174 the end of mass incarceration and broader contestation of the long
history of the criminalization and control of poor people and people of color in
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building capitalism;175 the recognition of ﬁnance and money as public infrastructures;176 the challenges posed by emerging forms of power and control arising from new technologies;177 and the need for a radical new emphasis on ecology.178 These are the materials from which a positive agenda, over time, will be
built.
Political ﬁghts interact generatively with scholarly and policy debates in
pointing the way toward a more democratic political economy. The emergence
of new grassroots movements, campaigns, and proposals seeking to deepen our
democracy is no guarantee of success. But their prevalence and inﬂuence make
clear the dangers and opportunities of this moment of upheaval—and highlight
the stakes of building a new legal imaginary.179 Neoliberal political economy,
with its underlying commitments to efficiency, neutrality, and antipolitics,
helped animate, shape, and legitimate a twentieth-century consensus that erased
power, encased the market, and reinscribed racialized, economic, and gendered
inequities. By contrast, a legal imaginary of democratic political economy, that
takes seriously underlying concepts of power, equality, and democracy, can inform a wave of legal thought whose critique and policy imagination can amplify
and accelerate these movements for structural reform—and, if we are lucky, help
remake our polity in more deeply democratic ways.
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